HomeMy WebLinkAbout1985-03-11 85-138 ORDER' 85-138
Introduced by Councilor Frankel, March 11, 1985
CITY OF BANGOR
(TITLE) (DrheT,. --- Authorizing fes'-zhase of Property_- 150 Front. Street
By the aft Chewed! of the City of Bang";
ORDERED,
THAT the following actions are hereby authorized relative to
the property located at 150 Front Street (Assessors Map
43, Lot 391
1.. The Director of Planning and Community Development
have the property appraised.
2. The Finance Committee approve the offering price for
the purchase of the property with the determination of
the offering price to be based on the appraisals of
'fair market value.
3. Upon acceptance of the offering price by the owner,
the Director of Planning and Community Development
acquire the property on behalf of the City of Bangor.
4. After the acquisition of the property by the City,
structures on the property be demolished and cleared.
IN CITY COUNCIL
Merck 11, 19&5
Amend by deleting paragraph
Passed Paeea Amended.
Depatf City Clerk
85-138
ORDER
Title,
Authorizi,g Wrchaee of eroperty....
.....................
150 Front Street
......................................
Introduced and filed by
P. !✓.W9A.4R!C.. ......
-
councilman
ryyy,
OrA, 3
6 C,, .C..
vl, . Y
March 8, 1985
TO: Bangor City Council
MCM: Robert Z Miller, City Solicitor
m: yrop a waterfront Cevelgment
By MertnraMw dated February 7, 1985, Councilor Willey asked me to give
him some direction concerning the following questlons: ,
(1) In the event the City of Bangor experts public monies
to lease property frou Irving Oil for the benefit of
the Mt. Katandin, does it violate anti-trust or
other laws?
(2) In the event the City of Bangor expands pw lic monies
to arrange said leasing, and provides preferential
treatment to the Mt. KataMin, does it violate anti-
trust or other laws?
(3) Mat legal requirement or obligation exists for Ire
City of Bangor to negotiate a lease between Irving
Oil and the Mt. KataMin for the use of said property _
by the Mt. KataMin?
On March 1, 1985 you received a Mery from Tort Flyna,.City Manager,
indicating that Irving oil was u Uling-to'love the Mt. KataMin dock on its
property: ThOrefors, the questions that Councilor Willey initially raised
regarliM the previously -proposed arrangement became moot. Mp or, ansa of the
issues indirectly relate to the propesed acquisition and use of the adjacent
Property owned by Superior Paper. If the City is in use public funds to anpnire
the Superior Paper property and tten develop it into a dockingfacility, is the
property being acquired and Used for a "public �se?" Would a contractual
arrangement with a third party to use and «orgy the property violate Federal
anti-trust laws?
Currently it is being proposed that the City of Bogor acquire tee
Superior Paper Cvapany property, demolish the building, and participate in tie
redevelopneM of the property for a docking facility. Use of the facility would
be contract d, on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis, with a private tour beat
operator.
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It is my understanding that there is a possibility that Community
Rrvelolment funds may he used as a part of ths transaction. If that is the
case, in addition to any restrictione that may be imposed by constitutional
provision or Rate law, the project will also be subject on cmmmity
mveloprent Regulations.
Article N, Part 3, Section 1 of the Maine Co,nmtitation prohibits the
Stam and its political sutdivisione from raising taxes for any p Closes other
than Puhllc purposes. This dOC rine is Imam az the •puhlic p¢pose doctrines
and has long been a part of the Smm•s constitutional law.
'Tb be constitutionally valid, taxation at either
the state or local level must he for a public
papose. E.g., Cromatt v. City of lbrtland, 150
Me. 217, 101 A.2d 841 (1954); opinion of the
Justices, 152 Me. 440, 131. A.2d A04 (19571: A
arnl5-ary'af that pminsition is that the
expenditure of public funds must be for a pihlic
purpose: Maine State Fkxming Authorit v.
OepoaimrS Trust Co., 278 A.2d 699 M. 1971). -
Casson Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 15 (Me. 1983).
Ths question of whether ton expenditure of public monies for the
acquisition and demolition of the Superior Paper property is for a -public
pspose" must be answered initially by the City Council, and later by the courts
— if challenged. See Comae Cause at 16. Discussions with the City Engineer
indicate that the prnpsed use of the property would be used essentially for
what might ne considered either recreational purposes or for purptaes of serving
a public transportation or umnerce nerd, thus attracting mom people to Bangor
and serving m onhanre the eoocony of the community, Such uses core, in my
-..opinion, within tha broad parameters of existing statutory legislation
authorizing the raising or appropriation of municipal funds.
30 M.R.S.A. 5 5106(4) pmvides'that a municipality may raise or
appropriate money:
(4) V-Mdim real estate and personal property
for recreationai purp sas. (Emphasis
sulvlr�
Use of funds for ins aSSiststCe of transportation or crnnrerce in the Eons of
public works projects is authorized under 30 M.R.S.A, 5 5103 which provides:
A municipality may raise or appropriate money:
1. Yazka and oxns[ruction ects. Providing
for public buildings, wZro. br dges, pa �,
public Place ,.sewers and drains; . . .
(FmphasiS supplied).
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Municipal construction ell operation of wharves or piece for was, by the
public is Carmel along the Maine coast. Statutory auhority for the acgwisition
a private ProPe[ty for such purposes is fount in 23 M.R.S.A. S .2801 which
states:
Towns may lav out pchlic Emir...
r cannon SaMims ant
MY alter cr drsantrhue seed i as . .
All procalures shall be in wbstance the since .
as is provided by law in the case of tam
ways. (Wphasis Srppiied).
Authority for the expenditure of funds for such purposes is fow in 30
M.R.S.A. §5108(2) which providea:
A municipality may raise or appropriate money:
(2)tivtlgrized by law. Providing for any
operations authorized by lav which, by
their nature, require the expenditure of
Morey.
in sunnary, it is my opinion that the City Council may use public fulls
ro acquire the Superior Paper property and redevelop it for public docking
facilities.
b clmia use of Publicly owned property by Private third parties is
discussed in fomes cause v.State, supra. In moon Cause there as an
agrearenc becwaen the City or onrclea , the Staca of Mairw and Math rich Wrks
for the development of a dry dock facility ant the Maine State Pier. Aa a part
of the transaction the city was to acquire certain lard adjacent to the, pier
property ant lease it, with the pier itself, tc,S The -stated purpose of the
Project as to inczease. the flow -of co merce in Rbrtland, enhance enployment
Oppartunities, and to improve the emnony of the State.
Mae Plaintiffs in (limon Cause conmPloj that irrespective of the stated
pnsposes, in situations where there is a proposed arrangerent for a use of the
Property to be acquired for a nonpublic plr m, i.e., the exclusive use by a
private entity, sal where the developnent ant Operation only inlireccly hamfits
the public through the provision of erployment opportmities, the coo titutional
public purpose test as not being not. The Court analyzal the contractual
arrmge ent between the State, the City of Portland, and Bath Iron Works, and
concluded that there were obligations Co the part of both sides which served the
ells of all parties.
Responding to the situation, the Court stated:
Plaintiffs are correct in their basic premise that
the agreerent has the effect of creating a subsidy
to BM out of pdalic finds.
Although a public subsidy is involved, certain
features of the Portland project set this case apart
fron any prior Maine case or advisory opinion
involving leblic subsidy of a private enterprise.
Its, project is unique in its potential for
extensive, long-term, favnrable emmenic impact; in
the detailed arrangements wrier a ich a large
private industry has beam casnitted to lcterm
obligations "insupport of a major industrial
development; ani in the expert testiatoy at trial,
tending to show that the project will improve
cosnerce ani create jobs, generating sufficient tax
revenues to repay the state's investment.
- Mtar reviewing prior decisions of the iaw must dealing with the public
Purpose issue, the (bort stated:
mt do not abadon the longstanding requirement that
taxation ai spending be for a pblic papnse. It
is wall settled that a public purpose is the
hallmark of legislation that is 'for the benefit of
the people' 'within tle meaning if tha legisietive-
paers clause.
Our inquiry into whether the Portlai project is
for a public purpose must prom i unencmnnbered by
any need to determine whether the assisted project
would meet the requisites for authorization of
eminent domain.
The question remains, I er, w ether the
Legislature has exceaded its power to tax ani spei
by subsidising an activity that does not confer
some form of direct benefit on the public. In
other words, may an iMirect benefit to tie ecomny
of the state ever constitute a public purlose to
validate a subsidy to private enterprise?
The chief indirect benefit predicted for the
Portland project will consist of the jobs
provided by the project itself and the economic
'ripple effect' of introducing new business into
the state. MO Maine case has held as yet that
public spending to stimulate the ecoxiay or
create jobs has a public purpose.
Yet, as this Court as consistently recognized,
the concept of public purpose is not static.
'What could not be deemed a public purpose a
century ago, may, because of changed economic and
industrial conditions, be such today. Laws Which
were entirely adequate to secure public welfare
than may he inadeguate to accomplish the some
results row.' (citations onitted) . "is
Court has approved public expenditures — and,
under the related -'public -use' dcotrine,
exercises of eminent domain — that might not
have passed muster in earlier times.
In other jurisdictions, it is widely accepted
that economic development is a public porpose.
1b be sure, there is sous merit in a blaniat rule that
ignores direct economic be efits. Such a rule, by
focusing on more easily measureable direct benefitssuch--
as rental payments or public use, would help insure that
the public gets its monies worth for its investment.
Moreover, the rule helps avoid the risk of approving
transactions sponsored by legislators who may have been
unduly donated by the private enterprise.
got these concerns can be met without the drastic rasely
of ignoring all indirect economic benefits. Ultimately,
in examining the constitutionality of a tax or spending
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measure, the Court should focus on Mether 'the plan
threaten a detriment to the public which outweighs the
benefit that mull have been anticipated.' Nota, suwa.,
59 ColuMia Law Raview at 647. In such a weighing, both
direct and i 91st benefits are relevant. A Oji gly,
Ws now hold that Indirect economic benefitspay be taken
inm consideration in aecadinq wTather c spwa= M
the state is iustified. (llmphasis suppl ed)
In conelusiw, the Common Cause care seem to stand for the proposition
that Under emstitutional "p 6u 3 c�iwrpose• limits governmental belies may enter
into agreements with private thirl parties for the occupancy of publicly omni
Isoperty where public needs are being serval and Mere the legislative holy has
first detenminred there are sufficient indirect economic benefits to the
community from the arrangement.
Mol -FRUST ISS0E
The second question raised by Councilor Willey vas Metter any kind of
contractual arrangement vitt a cruise operator at the facility could result in
the City being held liable for violation of Federal anti-trust lass.
Until just 6 years ago municipalities h9 always considered ttamselves,
along with the States, bmune from anti-trust liability under the "State Action
Dxtriw" asUnCiahNi by the United States Suiaere Court in parker v. Sasso, 317
U.S. 341 (1943). In ton owes, to Wit: City of Lafayette v. noufsiana Power 6
light bo., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) and Comwity C m mtiwm Co. V. city
Braider, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) the SupreeB �Urt narmmN the umunity available to
OF states and municipalities. 0be loss of total anti-trust immmity spurred
the nation's municipalities to seek legislative relief. Oo botcher 24, 1984
President Reagan signed a bill Mich prohibits all monetary danages from
municipalities or their employees for anti-trust violations. Noaver, the new
I" does not bar injunctive relief or the award of attorneys fees. Aa a result
municipalities still have to be conscious of the issue and take reasonable
precautions to avoid violations.
One of the frustrating problems in dealing With the issue is the
unsettled state of the law on local government anti-trust liability. The
current legal test for coal goverment anti-trust immunity is Mether action by
the government or its officials is m UCted pursuant to a "clearly articulated
sol affirmatively expressed state policy" in situations Mere anti-cmIWtitve
actions are taken in lieu of free competition. ahus, Men the City enters into
situations of granting expressed or implied exclusive rights to use publicly
owned facilities, the first question is Mather the arrangement has been
specifically authorizol by the State legislature.
As we have seen above numicipally-owed Marves are clearly autboriz9
by State statute. Nnxever, the granting of exclusive rights to use or operate
than is not. Therefore, there isn't a "clearly articulated and affirmatively,
expressel state policy" authorizing such exclusive arrangements. In my opinion,
the grunting of exclusive rights to any facility should be avoidel if at all
possible. If there is an unequivocal determination by the Council that an
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exclusive rights agreement would best serve the needs of the public and there is
no other way to meet your objectives (regardless of the desires of the operator)
and there has been a testing of the free uurket to get the best arregment
possible, you may enter into such an arrangement with proper controls.
The best way to test the free market is to go through a bidding
process. In my opinion, before contracting out the occugency of the facilities,
the Council should solicit proposals for the reuse of the property using
objative selection criteria. the criteria should net he develops by any
prospective bidders or other interested private parties. the selection
procedure should follow our normal bid procedures of advertising for bids,
giving a reasonable opportunity to prepare and submit proposals, and a neutral
ZaVieW of any proposals submitted. In addition, the selection process should
avoid closed meetings with any of the parties imiolvs, and other rcnduct by the
Council ani the staff that would give the appearance that the City seain any
way giving unfair advantage to one interested party over otters. Croce the bids
have been rereived, an award based upon the bid criteria should be made.
Another concern is the granting of long-tem lease or concession
arrarganents Mich will serve to tie ug the property for the foreseeable
future. A judgment has to be made as to the needs for continuity of service and
giving the operator an opportunity to gain back his investment and make a
reasonable. profit. Rowever, arbitrary long-term agreements are red flags to
those who wish to seek local liability for anti-trust violations.
In conclusion, it is W recanresation that expressed or implied
exclusive arringe ants be avoided if at all possible. Regardless of the
aera�anen[, the City should first go through a bidding process. Finally, all
agreemmrta should be:. tailors to the needs of the City, ss long-tars mntrects
should be avoided.
EXISTING CCNUVACr
As sora of the manbers of the Council may rmianber, Men fcauk Foss
originally POOP sed to operate a CrUeSs service on the Riva, sunilar issues
arose. At that time, the City went through a solicitation process. ultimately
Mr. Fess was awards a contract authorizing him certain non-exclusive rights to
use that existing municipaldocking; facility for limits periods of the year.
The teen of that contract goes through to the Fall of this year, with a
conditional option to renew for three additional years. If any .member of the
Connell would like a ravras the agreement, please call me.
R.F.M.
ho
oce City Manager
City Engineer
-. dbd mcmy