HomeMy WebLinkAbout1961-11-13 19-P ORDERby C� /9-n
CITY OF BANGOR
(TITLE) MrbPrt--- A - ptmg ReB,o t of Caty Manager Re Bangor CMl Defense
By tta City Coumoi( of the My of Bangor:
ORDERED,
THAT the attached report of the City Manager on Bangor Civil
Defense is hereby received.
IN CITY CCUMIL
Nov. 139 1961
The ordinance re4Yiring the filing
of a new order was
suspended by
the following yesand no vote 9
Councilors voting yes: Bailey.
Brountas, Delano, Gross, Higgins,
Whittaker. Councilors absent:
Barry, Brown, Blaisdell. PASSED
Subject matter referred to Public Safety
Committee.
UvCITY CLEFT
ORDER
num
Accepting. Report. of.. City. Manager. Re:
Bangor Civil Defense
w
e
ed
andd 6kd by
_. .bP """._.....
Gaadlmue
REPORT ON BANGOR CIVIL DEFENSE
November 2, 1961
Section I. Introduction
On September 11, 1961, the City ConncD passed Resolve 212N, which read as
follows:
^(TITLE) RESOLVE, Requesting Report from City Manager on Civil Defense
By the City Council of the City of Bangor:
RESOLVED,
That in view of theing danger of international nuclear
warfare and because Bangor is a primary potential target for enemy
attack, the City Manager is requested to prepare and submit to the City
Council a written report on the following items:
1. A resume of current national and state policies regarding civil
defense, with particular reference to bomb shelters m areas
subject to direct attack, fall -out shelters, evacuation procedures,
etc.
2. A description of present plans of the Bangor Civil Defense organization
with regard to bomb shelters, tall -out shelters, and evacuation procedures,
etc.
3. Recommendations concerning possible additional civil defence activities,
such as. for example, the construction of community bomb shelters
and/or fall -out shelters. "
Since that date, Ihave contacted both the State and Federal Civil Defense officials
attempting tos
mpile data necessary to comply with the Council's request and have
discussed the matter at some length with and haveraved a written report from,
Mr. James O'Connor, Bangor Civil Defense Director¢ce
In order that you might have for your files as complete an answer to the
problems that you pose as possible, I am attaching to this summary the following
addenda:
Addenda I A letter dated September 13th to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
and to Colonel Walter Kennett, Director of Maine Department of Civil
Defense.
Addenda D A copy of President Kennedy's remarks on Civil Defense before a
joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives May 25, 1961.
Addenda III A statement of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara before
the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Government Operations on August 1, 1961.
Addenda IV Report of the Committee on Government Operations on "New
Civil Defense Program" dated September 21, 1961, reported
as House Report No. 1249.
Addenda V A copy of a letter dated October 23, 1961 from Colonel Walter
Kennett to me in reply to the original letter of request.
Addenda VI. A copy of a report to me from Mr. James O'Connor, Civil
Defense Director for the City of Bangor.
Item 3 of the Resolve I shall attempt to cover in this summary.
Section 11. Summary of Reports
From a study of all the reports submitted, a few facts emerge which can be
used as basic assumptions:
I. It is the concensus of all officiate concerned that the City of Bangor
should be considered a prime military target and in the event of war,
subject to thermonuclear attack.
2. Based on enemy capabilities, (because we have no knowledge of enemy
intentional defense planning should be based on the assumption that
the thermonuclear weapon used would be a five megaton atom bomb.
3. Blast and fallout damage from the explosion of such a weapon will
vary determined upon the way it is used:
(a) R it is exploded as a "dirty" bomb with a ground detonation,
it is estimated that the damage would be as follows:
(l) Shock damage - A crater 2, 500 feet in diameter, an
area of complete destruction with a radius of 1-1/4
miles from ground zero. This is destruction caused
by shock, heat and wind and would probably destroy
everything, including underground fallout shelters.
(2) Blast destruction of framed dwellings (caused primarily
by wind - 7 mile radius from ground aero.
(3) Fire damage - ignition of frame structures - radius of 9
miles ground zero.
(b) If exploded as a "clean" bomb, about the same blast and heat damage,
but lees shock damage. Substantially less "fallout" would be generated.
SM
It is obvious, therefore, that a basement shelter would be of little value in
any frame dwelling within 9 miles of ground zero because the house would be ignited
and would burn on top of the shelter.
An underground shelter (separate from the house) would give protection from
shock, blast and heat anywhere in excess of 1-1/4 miles from ground zero.
Therefore, it follows that H the basic assumptions are;
a. The center of the runway at Dow Air Force Base would be the target
b. Complete accuracy of the weapon system
c. Use of the five megaton bomb;
it is possible to deduce where shelters should be built and what kind, However,
Nese are factors so variable that it is doubtful H there is any degree of validity to
planning based on them as precise assumptions.
In other words, if you are far enough away from ground zero, either by virtue
of the fact that your a not a prime target or by virtue of the fact that the weapon
misses its target, and if you are protected by an underground fallout shelter, your
chances of survival are tremendously increased. How s
, the deo whether or not
to construct such a facility depends on one's own individual judgment as to
l) The possibility of attack
2) The kind of attack (size of bomb) and
3) The accuracy of the attack
It seems important that there be full recognition of the difference between a
blast shelter said a fallout shelter, and the capabilities and limitations of each. Once
that is completely understood, it is then up to the individual to determine whether he
wishes to spend thenecessary money to develop a facility that may or may not give
him the protection requed to survive thermonuclear attack.
Section Ill. Community Fallout Shelters
The third part of Ne resolution called for recommendations concerning possible
additional Civil Defense activities such as the construction of community bomb shelters
and/or fallout shelters.
No coat estimates were developed for bomb shelters as such because it seems
obvious that the coat would be so excessive
as to make it impossible for any city to
afford such a facility. However, on the basis of the costa of fairly large community
fallout shelters, it is estimated that, a ing the City Council determined it should
provide community fallout shelters, (that is, that there are areas within the built-up
section d the city where fallout shelters would net be destroyed by shock effects) the
coat of the bare structures necessary would bw somewhere between $400,000 and
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$500,000. in addition to this, it would, of course, be ne cc Seery to install heating
uxiliary generating, lighting, sanitary facilities and ventilating equipment, as well
as food, water and medical supplies. If the Council feels that nuclear attack is a
sufficiently strong possibility, the city's borrowing capacity can Support this type of
expenditure, and that there arewithin the city where the chances a sufficiently
good that such fallout shelters will wid atandanclear attack to justify their construction,
then aucha program could be undertaken.
Addenda I
September 13, 1961
Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara
Pentagon
Washington, D. C.
Dear Secretary McNamara:
The City of Bangor. Maine with a papulation of about 38,000 people is located
about 20 miles from ostal waters but on a deep water river port. Within its 34 aquae
miles it contains Dow Air Force Base, which is a Strategic Air Command base with a
B52 Wing and an Air Refueling Wing as well as a Fighter Interceptor Air Defense
Command Squadron aM a major Bomarc Missile site. Dow Air Force Base is located
about three miles from the center of the City of Bangor and the Bomarc Missile site
about five miles from the center of the city.
We have what is considered a good Civil Defense organization, which is
built upon a nucleus of existing city departments augmented by volunteers and auxiliaries
from the police, fire and public works operations. It has been called into operation
during three previous civil disasters (all hurricaaee) and did an excellent job of main-
taining emergency services and protecting lives and property.
In the face of the current high level of international tensions, our Bangor
City Council has become concerned Over the state of our Civil Defense readiness and
at a Council meeting on September Ilth, passed a Resolve requesting that I make a
fairly thorough study of Civil Defense in the City of Bangor and report to it thereon.
I am attaching a copy of the Resolve that was passed and you will note that
one part of the request concerns "A resume of current national ---policies regarding
civil defense, with particular reference to bomb shelters in areas subject to direct
attack, fall -out shelters, and evacuation procedures".
I have President Kennedy's re arks on Civil Defense before a Joint Session
of the Senate and House of Representatives given May 25, 1961, as well as your
statement before the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Government Operations on Civil Defense given August 1, 1961. 1 a supplying copies
of both of these documents to the City Council.
However, because of the rather special circumstances surrounding our civil
defense problem due to the proximity of a Strategic Air Command base and a Bomarc
Missile site, 1 have need for information regarding your policies relating to such prime
target areas.
I think perhaps this information can beat be summarized by the following
questions:
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1. Does the Federal Civil Defense Agency consider the military
installations in the City of Bangor prime target areas?
Z. If so, what type of emergency should our civil defense department
assume we will be required to contend with, i.e.
a. Shouldwe anticipate and be prepared for thermonuclear attack
upon this installation?
b. If so, what sive of nuclear bomb ought we to be assuming will
be used?
3. Based on the above attack assumptions, should the Bangor Civil Defense
program be geared to tactical evacuation, and if so, haw much warning time could
it be anticipated would be given?
4. Would it be sensible to attempt to sell to the citizens of the City of Bangor
the idea of fallout shelters inasmuch as 90%x of our population lives within three miles
of the center of Dow Air Force Base?
5. At what distance from the center a a prime target does it become
feasible to begin the installation of fallout shelters?
6. Should our planning be predicated on the assumption that we will be given
time to carry out a strategic evacuation rather than on the possible necessity of a
tactical evacuation?
I realize that these are extremely difficult questions which have been posed
but I believe that you can understand the necessity for our getting the thoughts of the
Federal Civil Defense Agency on these matters.
I shall very much appreciate any assistance you may be able to give us in
preparing this study and report.
Yours truly,
/s/ Joseph R. Cooped, Jr.
CITY MANAGER
TRO/sc
Addenda H
President Kenedy'e remarks an civil defense before a Saint Session of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, May 25, 1961
One major element of the national security program which this Nation has never
squarely faced up to is civil defense. This problem arises not from present trends but
from past inaction. In the past decade we have intermittently considered a variety
of programs, but we have never adopted a consistent policy. Public considerations
have been largely characterised by apathy, indifference, and skepticism; while, at
the same time, many of the civil defense plans proposed have been so far reaching or
unrealistic that they have not gained essential support.
This administration has been looking very hard at exactly what civil defense can and
cannot do. It cannot give an assurance of blast protection that will be proof against
surprise attack or guaranteed against obsolescence or destruction. And it cannot
deter a nuclear attack•
We will deter an eneny from making a nuclear attack only if our retaliatory power is
o strong and ss invulnerable that he knows he would be destroyed by our response.
U we have that strength, civil defense is not needed to deter an attack. If we should
ever lack it, civil defense would not be an adequate substitute.
But this deterrent concept a rational calculations by rational m And the
history of this planet i suffici nt to remind us bi the possibilities of n irrational
attack, a miscalculation, an accidental war which cannot be either foreseen or deterred.
The nature of modern warfare heightens these possibilities. It is on this basis that
civil defense can readily be justified - as insurance for the civilian population in the
event of such a miscalculation. It is insurance we trust will never be needed - but
insurance we could never forgive ourselves for forgoing in the event of catastrophe.
Once the validity of this concept is recognized, there is no point in delaying the
initiation of a nationwide long-range program of identifying present fallout shelter capa-
city and providing shelter in new aid existing structures. Such a program would protect
millions of people against the hazards of radioactive fallout in the event of a large-
scale nuclear attack. To assure effective use of these shelters, additional measures
will be required for warning, training, radiological monitoring, add stockpiling of
food and medicines. And effective performance of the entire program requires not
only new legislative authority and more funds, but also sound organizational arrange-
ments.
1. Therefore, under the authority vested in me by Reorganization Plan No. 1
of 1958, I am assigning responsibility for this program to the top civilian
authority already responsible for continental defense, the Secretary of
Defense. It is important that this function recivilian in nature and
leadership and this feature will not be changed remain
for
preparedness programs ivection with health, food, manpower, transpov-
tatio and other needs in the event of an attack will besigned to the
appropriate department and agency heads, all of whom will work with
State and local agencies. For their role remains on essential one.
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2. The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization will be reconstituted
as a small staff agency to assist me in the coordination of these functions.
To more accurately describe its role, its title should be changed to the
"Dffice of Emergency Planning".
3. As soon as those newly charged with these responsibilities have
prepared new authorization and appropriation requests, such requests
will be transmitted to the Congress for a much strengthened Federal -
State civil defense program. Such a program will provide Federal
funds for identifying fallout shelter capacity in existing structures, and
it will include, where appropriate, incorporation m' shelter in Federal
buildings, new requirements for shelter in buildings constructed with
Federal financial assistance, and matching grants and other incentives
for constructing shelter in State and local government and private
buildings.
Federal appropriations for civil defense in fiscal 1962 under this program will in
all likelihood be more than triple the pending budget requests; and they will increase
sharply in subsequent years. Financial participation will also be required from
State and local governments and from private citizens. But no insurance is cost
free; and every American citizen and his community must decide for themselves
whether this form of survival insurance justifies the expenditure of effort, time
and money. For myself. 1 am convinced that it does.
Addenda ill
Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
Before the Military Operations Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Govermnent Operations
Civil Defense
Tuesday, 1 August 1961
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
It seems to me particularly fitting that I should appear here before you
on the day that 1 assume new responsibilities for as accelerated program in the
field of civil defense. I know that the pioneer efforts of your Chairman and
indeed of year entire subcommittee have played an important role in the develop-
ed of an awareness in the executive branch that civil defense is an essential
element in our total national defense program. As the President said last week,
"To recognize the possibilities of nuclear war in the missile age without our
citizens knowing what they should do and where they should go if bombe begin to
fall would be a failure of responsibility." You must be gratified to feel chat your
effotp are beginning to bear fruit.
When Executive Order 10952 announced less than two weeks ago the
responsibilities to be transferred to me, I stated that we would be guided by four
principles in administering the program within the Department of Defense.
"1. The Civil Defense effort must remain under civilian direction and
control, involving, as it does, the survival of every citizen. It
requires the closest and most sympathetic cooperation between the
federal civilian authorities and state and local governments.
12. In the age of thermonuclear war, civil defense must be integrated
with all aspects d military defense against thermonuclear attack.
113. The Civil Defense functions of the Department must not be
permitted to downgrade the military capabilities of our armed
forces.
114. Whatever expenditures are undertaken for Civil Defense projects
most be directed toward obtaining maximum protection for lowest
possible cost."
Defending the civilian population of the United States against the dangers
of a thermonuclear attack is net in itself a new responsibility for the Department.
Our primary reliance is on U.S. military forces as a deterrent against attack.
But if miscalculations, irrationality or accident produces an attack against the
continental United States, our defensive forces are prepared to meet and engage
the attacker.
Despite the damage that we might inflict on enemy aircraft, same of thea
aircraft would probably penetrate our defenses far enough to release their weapons.
_z_
We do not yet have any effective operative defense against ballistic missiles, and
some of those missiles would undoubtedly reach targets in the continental United
States. In a nuclear attack, several million Americana --perhaps several tens 4
millions --might be killed.
In the hypothetical attack examined in the 1959 Hearings of the Special
Committee on Radiation, of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, under the
Chairmanship of Mr. Holifield, it was estimated that approximately 50 million
Americans would have been killed and some 20 million other would have sustained
serious injury. No program of civil defense could save all of these people, at
least no program that is financially practicable. But a comparatively modest
civil defense program can provide a great deal of protection for people who are not
close to points of detonation.
The augmented civil defense program proposed by the President is designed
to protect the American people primarily against the dangers from fallout. I need
not detain this Committee with any explanation of the nature of the fallout problem o
the r why a fallout shelter program is at the core M any effective civil defense
program I do want to point out for the record, however, that protection against
fallout is much lees expensive than protection against blast and can be highly effective.
A megaton yield weapon can destroy the heart of a city. But a near -miss, up -wind,
could also wipe out the city's population, unless the citizens know how to take advan-
tage of the time following warning or the burst of a nuclear weapon in order to seek
previously identified and previously prepared fallout shelter.
I want to point out also that while a substantial blast shelter program is
directly somewhat competitive with active defense systems such as the NIKE ZEUS,
now m development, fallout shelter is complementary to such systems. H we are able
to develop a satisfactory missile defense system, the need for blast shelter is
proportionately reduced. But no currently conceivable anti-missile defense system
could cover the entire country. In the 1959 Hearings that I referred to just now, the
hypothetical attack produced initial dose rates exceeding 500 roentgens per hour M
about 11 percent of the national lard area. Even with effective active defense systema
for all the major targets in the United States, an enemy attack could produce enormous
fallout casualties unless shelter were available.
The President's program is designed to take advantage of available shelter,
and in so doing, it is designed to provide a large number of shelter spaces at the least
coat per shelter space in the near future. These spaces should be sufficient to give
reasonably adequate protection for about one-quarter of the population. At the e
time, the program is designed to explore the most economical ways of further ins as-
ing the number of shelter spaces by modifying the shelters now available, and by
planning for space in new construction adaptable to shelter use.
The heart of the President's program is the identification, marking and
stocking of available community shelter apace in existing buildings throughout the
United States. Our best estimate by extrapolation from pilot surveys made in the past
is that this program will identify some 50 million usable shelter spaces, and will
provide a minimum of shelter for approximately one-fourth of our population. This
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does not mean that the program will save 50 million lives. Again, as the 1959
study pointed out, nearly 75 percent of the deaths from the hypothetical attack
would have resulted from blast " thermal effects combined with immediate
radiation effects. Other patterns of attack might increase or decrease the proportion
of the population exposed to fallout alone, and thus increase or decrease the number of
lives that could be saved by fallout shelter. But it is probably a reasonable estimate
that the identification andmarking of existing fallout shelter space muld, without
additional effort, save at least 10 to 15 million lives in: the event of a thermonuclear
attack.
The survey of existing shelter space is not only a means to utilize the
greatest amount of protection that can be made available in a reasonably short
time, it is also a prerequisite for future planning. We canna work out a program
to modify existing shelter apace in order to increase its capacity; and we cannot
decide whether to include provisions for shelter in new buildings until we know how
much shelter is already available in relation to the distribution of the population and
proximity to possible targets. In other words, we can't decide what we need until
we find out what we have already.
It is not necessary, however, to await completion of the shelter survey
before beginning work on shelter modification and on plane for dual puyposershelter
space 5n new buildings. The survey itself. which is to be completed by December 1962
at a cost of 93 million dollars, will concentrate first on metropolitan areae, which
are also likely to have the largest number of available shelter spaces. At the same
time, we propose to initiate a $10 million pilot program to test in actual practice
umber of ways of modifying shelter space, primarily to increase capacity. We
e particularly interested in the possibilities of forced draft ventilation, operating
from standby emergencypower sources, in order to multiply capacity. This piiat
modification program will be confined to existing federal building a in order to avoid
problems of ownership eat control.
We propose also to proWe $7.5 million to cover the additional cost of
planning and construction to include fallout shelters he new federal buildings. Out
of this program we hope to develop architectural plans that will substantially reduce
the actual incremental cost a shelter in new buildings considerably below present
estimates. These programs will also serve as an incentive for state and local
governments and as a model for other public buildings, schools and offices.
As you are well aware, a shelter is of little value until it is stocked and
equipped with the minimum essentials for survival during the or -two-week period
that it may be continuously occupied. Since the spaces that we identify will be public
shelters--- and we will net mark them daises they can be made available to the
general public, although they may be located in privately -owned buildings. 1 believe
it is our responsibility to provide survival stocks and egopment. Also, the Federal
Government is in a position to procure the as stocks in quantities that make it
possible to bring their cost down to a minimum.
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We are proposing to equip the shelters with five-day austere emergency
rations. Consumption a this ration by some persons may involve same discomfort.
But in areas of highest fallout contamination, its ready availability will be essential
to survival.
The ration to be procured is to be packaged so as to have a shelf life of at
least five years. It will be inexpensive, easily prepared, and consistent with the
restricted water and heat available in shelters. A ration of this type has been
developed by the Department of Agriculture. Altough net comparable to the diet
of our citizens today, it is similar to the regular diet in certain areas of the world.
The basic ration need net be exhausted in five days. As you know, the duration of
shelter confinement can be estimated from radiation measurements. H the fallmrt
is extremely high, no food at all ahead be eaten for the first day or two, and shelter
occupants must stretch out their consumption. In some instances occupants may
bring some food with them to the shelter.
Water is more essential for survival than food. In aur planning we have
allowed a 3weeks' supply at the rate of one quart per person, per day, packaged in
special containers. Some first-aid medical supplies are necessary. Their ready
availability will eliminate the need for healthy occupants of the shelter to expose
themselves to radiation in order to search for first-aid supplies and assistance.
To use a fallout shelter effectively, the occupants must have meters to
determine the radiation dose rates, and accumulated doses inside, and the dose rates
outside the shelter. Iasnruments are available that meet requirements recommended
by a National Academy of Sciences committee. Lastly, shelter equipment includes
essential sanitation supplies, and simple tools in the event that the shelter should be
n the fringe of a blast area
and the zits become blocked with debris. The program
also includes some funds for secure storage of supplies in those shelters in which
secure storage is nor already available.
Available shelters can be more effectively used if thereis an adequate,
dependable warning system to tell people when to use them. In taking shelter from
fallout, time is not, as you know, critical, a ce the fallout travels with the wind
and will not fall back to the ground outside thn immediate circle of blast damage for a
half hour or more. Nevedieless, the present siren
ring system has serious
drawbacks. These are considerable time delays in some areas, and the sirens
may be inaudible indoors order some circumstances.
The President's program, therefore, include a good start on the installation
of a home warning W stem. the National Ems rgency Alarm Repeater (NEAR) system.
The NEAR system does net tell the citizen what to do-- it alerts him to turn on his
radio in order to receive instructions.
If an extensive system test in Michigan proves successful. it is proposed to
begin national installation of this household warning system, which operates on electrical
impulses imposed on regular power lines. Federal funds would be used to cover the
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oat of the signal generators. The receivers could be sold to the general public.
A marketing survey has already indicated ahigh acceptance rate at the anticipated
retail price of $5 to $10.
Any operation depends upon intelligence; defense against fallout depends
on Informationo n the natureof the fallout pattern and its intensity in particular
locations. ThePresident's program, therefore, contains fonds for radiological
detection equipment, to cover the cast of detection kits fora a 90, 000 monitoring
stations, in addition to the 50, 000 already equipped with kits} aerial monitoring
equipment; and individual dosimeters. These dosimeters would be used by workers
who may have to expose themselves to failoct when they undertake decontamination
operations, rescue work aM emergency distribution of food and essential supplies
from uttside stockpiles.
lastly, the President's program proposed to increase funds for research
and development more than three -fold. The program of identification, marking and
modification of shelter apace in existing structures is designed to buy all the shelter
protection we can at the least cast, in the shortest possible time. To assure that
any additional units of protection purchased at a later date are also obtained at
lowest coat, a vigorous program of research and development is required. Similarly,
we believe that research and development can reduce the cost and increase the
effectiveness of warning add emergency communication systems. The experience
and facilities of the Department of Defense in research and development work should
be particularly helpful in pointing out paths that civil defense research and development
ought to explore.
Another element m the program is funding to begin to provide fallout protection
and standby power for the approximately 1, 300 broadcasting stations cooperating in the
emergency broadcast system. The program also contains funds to provide backup
communications for vulnerable wireline links between these stations and local and
regional civil defense headquarters by providing simple radio communications equipment.
It contains funds to improve the National Warning System (NA WAS) which rune from
North American Air Defense Headquarters to some 450 warning points throughout the
country. NAWAS is manned around the clock. It is tested daily, and it works. It is
the spreading of the warning signal from the warning points that require¢ attention,
including improvement of the siren system, which is still necessary to warn people
out-of-doors.
Many people, including previous-0ufense officials, have been apprehensive about
the consequences of bringing civil defense under what has been described as "military
ontrol", as well as the dangers ofdegrading military capabilities. As I indicated
earlier in my statement, we propose to organise the Civil defense function under civilian
control, as a separate unit attached to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. There
are a umber of ways, however, in which the civil defense organisation can take
advantage of the competnece and capabilities of other units within the Department, without
in any way detracting from the armed forces' primary military obligations. For example,
the district offices of the Army Corps of Engineers and of the Navy Bureau of Yards and
Docks can be called upon to contact with civilian architects and engineers for the proposed
shelter survey. The civil defense warning system becomes most effective when it is
considered as an extension of the North American Air Defense (NORAD) Warning System.
a
While responsibility for civil defense is focused in the Department of
Defense under the new Executive Order, certain specific civil defense functions
are delegated to other agencies. Responsibility for maintaining stockpiles of
Food and medical supplies are specifically excepted from the Executive Order,
and it is expected that these responsibilities will be delegated respectively to the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
Under a series of Emergency Preparedness Orders, the Office of Civil and Defense
Mobilization has delegated a number of specific functions to other Federal agencies.
These delegations continue in effect, although they are now subject to coordination
by the Department of Defense to the extent that they affect the new civil defense
responsibilities of the Department.
It may be useful for me to summarize some of theca civil defense delegations
briefly:
The Department of Agriculture, in addition to its expected food stockpiling
responsibilities, is responsible for rural fire control and for protection of planta
and animals against radiological, chemical and bacteriological hazards.
The Department of Commerce is responsible for developing plane to restore
streets and highways, for the emergency use of civil air transport and for the use of
shipping in emergency.
The Federal Aviation Agency is responsible for emergency plane for civil
airports and airways.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, in &"fit= to its expected
medical stockpile responsibilities, is responsible for planning care of refugees from
an attack, including provision of location services. It conducts adult education
programa to acquaint the general public with these duties and resp onsibilities in
emergency, and it is responsible for introduction of information on civil defense into
school and college curricula.
The Department of Interior is responsible for emergency plane for the power
and petroleum industries.
The Department of Labor is responsible for planning for use of emergency
manpower, except medical manpower, in the immediate poet -attack period.
The Poet Office Department is responsible for establishing a registration
service for individuals and families.
The Housing and Home Finance Agency is responsible for developing plane
and programs for emergency housing and community services in the poet -attack pe rind.
The Interstate Commerce Commission is responsible for developing plans
and programa for use of domestic service transportation in emergency.
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It is apparent from this exposition that the relations of the Department of
Defense with other Federal departments_ ,d; ncizsittadm=isterm the he civil_ _
defense program are quite complex. The transfer of civil defense responsibilities
to the Department requires the establishment of new linea of communication, which
are going to have to be worked out over the coming weeks and menthe.
I am well aware that the Federal responsibilities which I have just described
are complementary to the responsibilities of the States as prescribed in the Federal
Civil Defense Act. The Department of Defense has for some time been in touch with
State and local Civil defense organizations through its representatives on the Regional
Civil and Defense Mobilization Boards. As you know, the Department of the Army
has designated the principal Defense representatives on each regional board, and the
Navy and Air Force designate an assistant to the Defense representative. These
representatives have participated in all of the deliberations of the regional boards,
Including the review of the State and local survival plane, and the Departure at participates
In teat exercises.
I am also aware of the fragmentary nature of most State and local civil
defense planning. A few states have made extraordinary efforts. As of June 30
of this year, only seven states, nice counties. and eight cities possessed protected
emergency operating centers, and another seven states, twenty-two counties and
twelve cities had centers under construction. In more than two-thirds of the states,
there is no operating center now available and equipped to function in a civil defense
emergency.
We have not yet determined what form of regional organization would be
most appropriate to carry out our responsibilities to assist State and local governments
in planning to protect themselves and to provide emergency survival services.
State and local governments have available to them vast resources of
trained manpower and equipment in their police and fire departments, civil engineering
offices and public utility services. These resources must be organized foremergency
operation, however, and plans must be formulated now so that thee ing elements
n operate independently and can reestablish communications withother survivors in
order to reconstitute an organization after an attack.
The Department of Defense has been an active and important participant he
existing programa.: to provode supplies and equipment for civil defense purposes. The
total acquisition coat of the equipment made available since- this program began in 1956
is estimated at $195 million. The Department.will, of course, continue to make this
equipment available in addition to assuming responsibility for administration of the
program.
The last three years have seen a substantial acceleration in matching funds
contributions to State and local civil defense organizations, from $10 million in 1960
to $22 million projected for FY 1962. The bulk of the FY 1962 funds, $12 million, will
go for salaries of State and local employees. An administrative device to be explored
in this connection is the consolidation of county civil defense units in sparsely located
regions into multi -county districts to permit more efficient operations. Such an
arrangement has already been undertaken in South Dakota, and we plan to explore its
applicability in cher parts of the muntry.
$5 million is planned for contribution to construction of state emergency
operating centers --a program that we hope to accelerate. The remaining $5 million
covers equipment and supplies for a variety of State and local emergency services.
What happens after a thermonuclear attack depends largely on the kind of
planning that has preceded the attack. But any plan must allow for a wide range of
contingencies. One of these contingent matters is the availability of military personnel
to assist in providing emergency survival services. The primary mission of all
military personnel, whether active or reserve, isaarily military operations.
But a current Department of Defense directive provides that "Military support to civil
authorities incivil defense operations is emergency task within them ion nt all
Federal active duty and reserve wits of the military services." It further provides
that : "The military departments shall be prepared to furnieh assistance to civil
authorities for a limited period in domestic emergencies, utilizing resources not
required in the execution of their essential military missions."
Present plane do not contemplate a mediate mobilization of stand-by
reserve forces. A major portion of the stand-by reserves might be available for
civil defense assignment. Such utilization of stand-by reserves is one of the possibi-
lities that we expect to explore.
Since any thermonuclear attack will undoubtedly find a large portion of our
military establishment located in the continental United States, a civil defense emer-
gency is a common concern for military and civilians alike. Placing nt civil defense
responsibility under the Department of Defense should facilitate a common effort to
plan for, and, if necessary, to conduct emergency operations.
The changes introduced in the defense program by the President have all been
in the directionof increased flexibility in order to deal with a wider range of defense
problems. As the size and range of strategic weapons are multiplied, civil defense
becomes n essentialelement to round out our over-all defense capabilities. The
proper balance between active and passive defense is always open for discussion. By
any standard, however, thepresent level of civil defense spending is not only made -
quests but extremely wasteful. It buys an .organization, but it does not buy a program.
The program proposed by the President will not satisfy everyone. It is not
large enough to guaranteesurvival for all our citizens in a large-scale nuclear attack.
No program that is financially feasible can dos . What it does do is to offer the
greatest amount of protection against nuclear attack that can be made available to our
civilian population in the near future, while actively exploring possibilities for
practical achievement of greater shelter capacity in the future.
The proposed program involves no future commitments, other than a commit-
ment to stock the remaining 20 million shelter spaces expected to he identified and
stocked in FY 63. The approximate cost of the additional stockage is $2 per space,
or $40 million. Depending on the results of the pilot modification program and of the
construction program for shelters in Federal buildings, decisions can be made and
proposals advanced about the future shelter program.
The present warning and communications systema will require continuing
support at their present level. ll the NEAR system is to be installed on a national
basis, it will require an additional investment over a three or four year period a
some $50-60 million. On the other hand, by integrating the civil defense national
warning and emergency communication systems with military systema, it may be
possible to effect substantial economies while at the same time providing increased
efficiency. The future of matching funds program a for State and local activities is
difficult to predict. If the over-all civil defense effort is to be effective. State and
local participation must increase
r
substantially, but this may be offset
by State and local governments assuming a larger share a the coats.
As you pointed out to me, Mr. Chairman, in your invitation, "The President's
decision to revitalize this long -neglected program makes these hearings particularly
timely. Your Subcommittee is new in a position to provide a valuable forum to
interpret the new program to the Congress and the people of the United States. I
welcome this opportunity to appear before you and to eWist your support.
Addenda V.
OFFICE OF MAINE CIVIL DEFENSE AND
PUBLIC SAFETY
State House
Augusta, Maine
October 23, 1961
Ltr. 1224-Eng-Penob.
Mr. Joseph R. Coupal, Jr., City Manager
City Of Bangor
City Hall
Bangor, Maine
Dear Mr. Coupal:
Your letter of September 13 asking specific questions concerning survival prepared -
as for the inhabitants of the City of Bangor hag been received. Please pardon the
delay m answering, as the pressure of the activity of this office has been far above
normal in the past few weeks.
Some of the questions you pose are difficult to answer, since all of our planning
assumptions are based on enemy capabilities. If we knew their intentions, I know
you will agree that our planning Make would be much easier.
I will attempt to answer your questions in the sequence that you have asked them
L Yes (Bangor prime military target)
2.- A. Yea (Thermonuclear attack)
2. B. Again assumptions, type of target and weapon yield -5 megaton.
3. (Tactical Evacuation) Here again the decision to disperse or evacuate all
or part of the population must be a local one, based on weather conditions,
warning time, and the pre-plam:ing coordination between the target area and the
r ceptionsigned, as to (1) traffic control outside of the target limits to
assure a contiareas
nuous uninterrupted movement of cars to their designation and a
workable reception plan to receive and care for evacuees, once they arrive.
(2) Tactical warning time. Some target areae have already ruled out the
feasibility of attempting to move people under the tactical movement concept,
because with the threat of a missile attack, warning time may be reduced to
a quick take -cover acdna. The State policy = warning is still to Bound the take
cover signal with thirty minutes or lees warning time. With mam,ed bombers,
the warning time can be expected to be a little longer. Here then comes the
local decision on what your dispersal plan should be geared to. Should we forget
about tactical evacuation and. concentrate our planning on a strategic movement
if trig type of warning will allow us several hours to do the job. Our mission
again is to ea many lives as possible, knowing that regardless of how well
our pre -planning is conceived, we cannot, and will not save eve byone.
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4. (Fallout Shelter) Again we have certain factors to consider in attempting to
solve a question of this kind. First, because of probable diming errors,
Bather, the type of weapon carrier (plane or missile) war head size, we cannot
be sure that a nuclear device would strike in the center of Dow Air Force Base.
(h could well land in the center of the city or it could hit west of the military
installation.) In any case, the area beneath the fireball and the zone M total
destruction could vary considerably. The situation could also be,, that in the
ant of a bomb drop in the Bangor area, there may be only sufficient warning
time to take c m How then would you determinewhat 90% of your citizens
you would advise on (1) building blast type shelters; (2) building strictly fallout
shelters, either basement or underground; or (3) building nothing because of a
plan to move them out of the blast area before the fact. Ia answer then to this
question, which to me is the most difficult of the six, I would say provide shelters
by all means. First, type of shelter depending on space available, and ability to
pay, (I) blast resistant underground type, (2) underground fallout type, and (3) base-
ment falloot type.
The Federal Government, as yin probably know, is instituting a shelter survey
program, the purpose of which is to spot and mark suitable fallout shelters,
(buildings) that would house several people (community type), and stock these
shelters with an austerity ration, medical supplies, etc.
5. The Federal Government has provided little 8 any guidance on exact distances
affected outside of prime target areas. We have been able to deduce exact
information only where we select a certain megaton war head and assume a surface
or n air burst. This assumption "assumes" something we do nor have definitely
to answer a specific question.
b. I would say " yes" to this, because if the decision were mine as local Civil
Defense Director, I would want to know that if evacuation is ordered,that;
(1) There is sufficient time to clear everyone out of passible blast area.
(2) That time would permit thepeople to be well on their way beyond the
permrmeter of the target so as not to be affected by initial radiation.
(3) That there is adequate reception for these people in the area assigned,
and that this has been coordinated between the County Director of
Penobscot and the County Directors of the reception counties involved.
I have tried in a small way to attemjttoanewei these questions based on information
available to us. I don't believe anyone can give specific answers to your questions in
detail. The staff in this office will be available to you for any further discussion on this
matter to help you add Sim O'Connor in every way possible.
Sincerely,
/e/ Walter H. Kermit
Director
WHK:gfb
Addenda W.
tel- REPORT ON BANGORCIVIL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AS R£OU£STED BY
JOSEPH R. COUPAL, JR.
Bangor Civil Defense in conjunction with Penobscot County and the State of Maine
have developed the following plana based on three assumptions as to existing con-
ditions at any given time.
1. Assuming that world conditions w e becoming so critical that
war was imminent but bad not been declared.
2. Assuming that an attack was either anticipated shortly or
actually in progress and the estimated time of arrival of planes
or bomb was at least two hour a.
3. Assuming no warning was received and attack was made either
nuclear or non-nuclear.
Assumption 1
Sine Bangor is considered a prime target area, aD pare ,,necessary to the
safety and welfare of the city, would be requested to leave as o as possible.
No specific instructions as to destination would be given at this time; allowing
those persona having camps or cottages outside the target area to make use of these
facilities as well as those with friends or relatives in adjoining towns. All others
would be handled in accordance with the state plan in which each town is allocated
people in accordance with its ability to feed and house them and as indicated on the
accompanying map "Appendix All. State and county authorities have plane on file
for feeding and housing in accordance with the figures shown on this map. It is
the responsibility a Bangor to see that the totals shown on each exit route are not
exceeded. Transportation for those persons needed would be provided by trucks
and buses with reserve police and two-way radio equipped cabs being used for
traffic control leaving the regular police free to continue their regular duties.
Assumption 2
When a warning is received by the city of Bangor at the police department which is
a key point in the national set up, the sirens are sounded immusliately giving the so-
called yellow alert signal. This is a continuous scantling ot the sirens for three
mutes followed by a minutes pause and then repeated for three times. At the same
time voice warning will be given through the poxtapage unite that would be mounted
on pplice cars. This signal indicates that all persona except Civil Defense personnel
shell proceed to their homes immediately. Cabe are automatically dispatched to pick
up school bus drivers and convey them to the bus garage. All school children except
those riding the buses would be dismissed immediately and those pupils awaiting buses
would be prepared to board buses as soon as they arrive. Arrangements have been
made with local trucking companies to dispatch a certain numbe r of trucks to each
hospital as so as the alert is sounded. The number ha ing been determined by the
results of repeated census counts aM is considered sufficient to convey all patients
that could safely bemoved as well as sufficient medical supplies for that period of
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time necessary to get the patients to one of the sixteen locations where 200 bed hospitals
e stored. Personnel have been trained to assemble these hospitals and be able to
receive patients inless than one hour.
School and Civil Defense personnel are alerted through a phone fanout in addition to
the sirens. When Civil Defense personnel have assembled at the control center and
all factors such as weather, road conditions and estimated time of arrival are con-
sidered,
-
sidered, the decision whether or not to evacuate would be made at this time. If ih is
made this would be assumption 42. If it were necessary to use c nelrad, instructions
would be given directly from the control center over facilities now installed and checked
at regular intervals in accordance with FCC regulations. If conelrad were not in effect,
regular radio and TV channels would be used. All persons would be advised to leave
the city as soon as possible in any direction that was convenient. Anticipated exit
loads based on latest census figures are shown an the accompanying map "Appendix 8".
These figures are within the limits set by the state plan. Radio equipped cabs would be
on patrol as a means of communication to the control center and stationed at each
playground. Playgrounds have been chosen as pick up pointe for those desiring trans-
portation since it is illegal to indicate identifibie points over the air during an alert
and playgrounds are well known in each neighborhood. Trucks, buses and partially
filled cars would be routed to those playgrounds for people desiring transportation.
Amateur radio operators with mobile equipment would be on continuous patrol throughout
the city feeding information to me control center as well as being stationed at Dow Field
antral and at each hospital to case of phone failure. Dow Field dependent personnel
will assemble in accordance with their own plan and will be picked up at gates 5 and i
and integrated into the out -going flow of traffic. n accordance with a pre -arranged
agreement, Ohio Street will be closed to out -going traffic beyond the Griffin Road to
allow Capehart personnel to approach Dow in accordance with instructions already
given. Route 2 from Dow to Newport will be used only until such time as
we are
notified by Dow control that they wish either to move missiles or evacuate
uatecertain
military personnel. At this time traffic will be rerouted over theinterstate to either
Man or the east side, whichever is more desirable. The aim at this time will be to
get as
any people as possible at least ten miles from town with the final destination
beingdecided as conditions warrant. Radio equipped cars at various locations can
relay
information at all times as to traffic conditions allowing rerouting changes when
necessary. The complete plan is set up in such a way that it is possible to obtain
information as to conditions at any time and change any phase as necessary to meet the
new conditions.
Assumption 3
If no warning is received, it is obvious no instructions can be given until Civil Defense
personnel either assemble at city hall if this is possible or contact each other via mobile
radia. If it is possible to get to city hall, all information available would be analysed
and instructions given to the public via radio and TV if possible or conedradi if neceeeary.
R fallout were a factor, it would be necessary to stay under cover until such time as the
intensity dropped to a safe value. Monitoring instrumentsinthe hands of trained
personnel would determine when each area of the city would be safe and the public
notified by whatever means that would be available. Fallout plotters we old receive
information from Penobscot control regarding bombs n other areas and determine
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after plotting intensities on maps, what areae might receive fallout and the expected
time and advise those areas what procedure to follow.. Each hospital in the area would
follow its own disaster plan and if necessary one or more of the portable 200 bed
hospitals would be moved into the area and set up where necessary. Food and other
supplies would be placed under control and rationed as necessary.
It is obvious that if a direct hit is made on Dow, Bangor will have no problem since
it will no longer exist. It will only be necessary for the few survivors to move out as
soon as it is practical and return when it is safe
Submitted September 18, 1961 by /s/ S. F. O'Connor